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Overview
Generating quantitative predictions for complex cognitive
phenomena requires precise implementations of the underly-
ing cognitive theory. The history of computational modelling
includes many diverse approaches to this problem of creating
process models. These include models of single phenomena
(such as Sternberg’s model of STM; (Sternberg, 1966)), to in-
tegrated models covering a wide range of different phenom-
ena (such as Soar (Newell, 1990) and ACT-R (Anderson &
Lebie`re, 1998)), to over-arching principles, which guide the
development of models in disparate domains (such as con-
nectionist approaches (McLeod, Plunkett, & Rolls, 1998), or
embodied cognition (Pfeifer & Scheier, 1999)).
This tutorial focuses on the EPAM/CHREST tradition,
which has been providing significant models of human be-
haviour for 50 years. The first implementation of EPAM (El-
ementary Perceiver and Memoriser) was developed by Ed-
ward Feigenbaum in 1959. Early models of EPAM pro-
vided the impetus to develop the chunking theory (Chase
& Simon, 1973; Gobet et al., 2001), which has been an
important component of theories of human cognition ever
since. With an emphasis on learning phenomena, EPAM
and CHREST (Chunk Hierarchy and REtrieval STructures)
are sensitive to the ways in which a model’s information is
built up through interactions with an external environment.
Thus, EPAM/CHREST models are typically developed from
large quantities of naturalistic input. For example, in mod-
elling expert perception of chess players, actual chess games
are used (Gobet & Simon, 2000). Similarly, in modelling the
acquisition of syntax, large corpora of mother-child interac-
tions are employed to develop the model’s long-term mem-
ory (Freudenthal, Pine, Aguado-Orea, & Gobet, 2007).
The tutorial is structured so that participants will:
1. Acquire a complete understanding of the EPAM and
CHREST approach to computational modelling, and their
relation to the chunking and template theories of cognition;
2. Explore some key learning phenomena supporting the
chunking theory, based around experiments in verbal-
learning, categorisation and the acquisition of expertise;
3. Be introduced to an implementation of CHREST which
can be used for constructing models of their own data.
Further information about CHREST, supporting publications
and implementations can be found at: http://chrest.info
Chunking and Template Theories
A chunk is a ‘familiar pattern’, an item stored in long-term
memory. Chunks collect together more basic elements which
have strong associations with each other, but weak associ-
ations with other elements (Chase & Simon, 1973; Cowan,
2001). The chunking theory is based on Miller’s observa-
tion (Miller, 1956) that short-term memory typically contains
a limited number of pieces of information, but that the size
of these pieces varies with context. Chase and Simon (1973)
confirmed the presence of chunks in the recall of chess po-
sitions, and the EPAM model provides a means of learning,
storing and retrieving such chunks.
The template theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996, 2000) extends
the chunking theory by adding mechanisms to create retrieval
structures, using specific retrieval cues to store and obtain in-
formation rapidly. The template is a form of slotted schema,
containing a core, of stable information, and slots, contain-
ing variable information. Where the chunking theory cap-
tures much of how the average person learns in tasks such as
verbal-learning, the template theory further captures the way
in which highly-trained human experts perceive and identify
patterns in their domain of expertise.
A more detailed overview of the chunking and template
theories is contained in Gobet et al. (2001).
Implementation
CHREST comprises three basic modules:
• Input/output module, which is responsible for feature ex-
traction, passing the features to the long-term memory for
sorting, and guiding the eye movements;
• Long-term memory, which holds information in the form a
discrimination network; and
• Short-term memories, which hold pointers to nodes in the
long-term memory.
The key feature which distinguishes EPAM/CHREST
models is the discrimination network for storing and retriev-
ing information in long-term memory. Information is as-
sumed to form a list of subobjects, each of which is either
a further list of subobjects or else a primitive. Tests in the
discrimination network check for the presence of individual
primitive objects, or a list of subobjects. The discrimination
network is trained by exposing CHREST to a large set of nat-
uralistic data. Typical sizes of network for an expert in a com-
plex domain is of the order of 100,000 nodes.
In both EPAM and CHREST, chunks are stored as nodes
within the discrimination network. CHREST also includes
mechanisms to bring together chunks when an internal node
meets specific criteria relating to its connections with other
nodes within memory. A template is then formed from the
common information in the linked chunks, with slots created
for the variable information. Just as EPAM was the compu-
tational embodiment of key aspects of the chunking theory,
CHREST implements essential aspects of the template the-
ory.
Input can be provided to CHREST in one of two ways.
As a single pattern, which is assumed to be perceived in a
single glance. These patterns are input to the network and
stored directly. The second way is to use the in-built atten-
tional mechanism, by which CHREST scans an input array,
such as a chess board, and stores parts of the input array into
memory. Short-term memory will then hold a set of chunks,
each of which may hold information about a different part of
the chess board, and collectively holding information about
most of the board. The attention mechanism in CHREST is
described in Lane, Gobet, and Ll. Smith (2009).
CHREST is implemented in Lisp, and uses Tk to provide
a graphical interface. A graphical environment enables users
to create simple CHREST models by providing data within
an input data file. The implementation also supports more
complex tailored models which may be developed by writing
special-purpose code using the packages within CHREST.
Within the tutorial we will introduce participants to the graph-
ical environment, walk them through a number of provided
examples which will illustrate the workings of the architec-
ture and some samples of successful applications, and finally
describe the input data format for applying the environment
to new domains. A library and manual is provided to assist
users wishing to write more complex models.
Applications
A variety of experimental data will be covered to illustrate the
theory and processes. The EPAM learning system itself was
initially developed as a simulation of human verbal learning
processes. EPAM’s memory structure is constructed through
an interlinked set of learning operations which alternately ex-
tend and elaborate information in the network. We illustrate
these key learning processes using applications from verbal
learning (Feigenbaum, 1959; Feigenbaum & Simon, 1984).
Further properties of the chunking network will be described
with reference to results from categorisation (Gobet, Rich-
man, Staszewski, & Simon, 1997), implicit learning and lan-
guage learning (Freudenthal et al., 2007; Jones, Gobet, &
Pine, 2007).
More elaborate models of expertise require an understand-
ing of how information is retrieved from the external environ-
ment. To illustrate this aspect of the theory, we focus on chess
expertise, particularly the challenge of the recall task. This
application is used to describe CHREST’s attention mecha-
nisms (Lane et al., 2009) and how they relate to training the
discrimination network.
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